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Commercial Launch Investment Proposal

US$500,000 to take Asafo Sentinel, LaundryHub and Serene to market in Ghana over eighteen months. Built line by line, sourced to the regulators and statistical agencies that publish the underlying data.

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Executive Summary

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The request

US$500,000 for an eighteen-month commercial launch of three completed products in Ghana: Asafo Sentinel, LaundryHub and Serene.

The figure is calculated from the bottom up — headcount, acquisition, infrastructure, compliance — and is set out line by line in Section 6. It is **below the median seed round publicly reported for any one of the three categories** this company operates in.

What is already true

Products built	Three, all deployed and tested. Five mobile applications, three web products, one administrative platform.
Development capital required	None. This raise funds launch, not building.
Cost to serve, measured	Below US$0.01 per fraud check; US$0.23 per laundry order; US$0.33 to US$1.22 per mental-health subscriber per month.
Team today	One person. Removing that dependency is the first call on this capital.
Revenue today	None. A three-month supervised pilot precedes this raise and is funded separately.

Why these three markets

Asafo Sentinel — fraud interception. Ghana's central bank publishes the problem annually: reported fraud cases rose from 15,164 in 2022 to **24,778 in 2025**, with GH¢101 million at risk. Mobile money accounts for 97% of cases, and its case count rose 54% in a single year. The buyers are enumerated in public registers: 23 banks, 71 licensed payment providers, 147 rural banks and three mobile network operators. The product interprets fraudulent calls that switch language mid-sentence — the technique used specifically to defeat existing monitoring — and acts on funds and handsets in about one second rather than raising an alert.

Serene — mental-health support. Ghana has **5.4 mental-health workers per 100,000 people** against a high-income median near 52, and spends 0.9% of government health expenditure on mental health. Treatment coverage for major depressive disorder is **0.61%**. A private therapy session in Accra costs GH¢320 to GH¢900. Serene is a few dollars per month: not a substitute for that session, but the difference between it and nothing.

LaundryHub — household services. Greater Accra has 1.7 million households and Ghana's lowest poverty incidence. The product is built and an order has been processed end to end. It is also the weakest-supported of the three: Glovo invested about US$3.7 million in Ghana and exited in May 2024 citing profitability, and live Accra pricing shows collection and delivery costing more than the laundry itself at typical basket sizes. LaundryHub therefore receives the smallest allocation and is the product most explicitly conditional on its pilot result. **It is the option in this portfolio, not the thesis.**

What this proposal does not claim

Diligence will test these numbers, so the weak ones have been removed in advance:

- The widely circulated "98% mental-health treatment gap in Ghana" is **not used**. It traces to a 2007 WHO extrapolation from a global survey that did not include Ghana. Per-condition treatment coverage from WHO's 2022 Ghana assessment is used instead.
- **No Ghana-specific mobile-money fraud rate is asserted**, because none is published. Regional figures dominated by Nigeria are not presented as Ghanaian.
- **No Asafo Sentinel contract value is assumed.** None is published, and establishing one is an explicit pilot objective.
- Conflicts between credible sources are disclosed rather than resolved by choosing the more favourable figure.

Two legal questions are unresolved, and they are disclosed here

Whether Asafo Sentinel requires **its own licence** is genuinely open. The Bank of Ghana operates a licence category whose published permissible activities explicitly include "fraud management services", and Ghana's Cyber Security Authority has required a licence for managed threat detection since March 2023, where unlicensed operation is an offence. Separately, **whether Ghanaian law permits recording a live call on the operator's authorisation alone, or requires every party's consent, could not be resolved** from public sources.

Both are funded and scheduled as month-one actions, and an investor is entitled to make the counsel opinion a condition of drawdown. One of them — the licence category is reported to be restricted to Ghanaian-owned entities — interacts directly with the ownership structure of this investment and should be settled with counsel **before a round closes**. Section 7 sets both out in full.

Where the money goes

CATEGORY	AMOUNT	SHARE
Personnel — 6 people by month 3, 13 by month 18	US$210,000	42%
Customer acquisition	US$123,000	25%
Infrastructure and model inference	US$43,000	9%
Legal, regulatory, licensing and independent security audit	US$30,000	6%
Equipment and workspace	US$25,000	5%
Contingency at 15%	US$65,000	13%
Total	**US$500,000**	

What it produces

BY MONTH	OUTCOME
3	No production system dependent on a single person
6	First institutional trial executed; national-system integrations live under signed agreements
12	First fraud-prevention revenue contract; LaundryHub repeat rate confirmed or the product held at maintenance cost
18	Base-case run rate of approximately **US$294,000**, at approximate operating breakeven

The objective of this raise is not a valuation event. It is to reach the point where the business sustains itself, so that any subsequent capital is raised from evidence rather than from need.

The principal objection, addressed

Three products in three unrelated markets is the reasonable objection to this proposal, and it is answered structurally rather than rhetorically. Capital is not divided evenly: the pilot preceding this raise produces a measured result for each product, and products that fail their threshold are held at maintenance cost of approximately US$28 per month or discontinued. The three share one engineering team and one infrastructure platform, so the marginal cost of the third product is low. Only one requires a sales organisation.

An investor unwilling to fund a portfolio at this stage should fund Asafo Sentinel alone — clearest buyer, highest contract value, strongest published evidence of need. This proposal is structured so that option remains available.

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Market Opportunity

Every figure in this section is attributed to a named source with its publication date and reference period. Where sources conflict, both figures are shown and the conflict is stated rather than resolved by selection. Where a figure is derived rather than published, it is labelled an estimate and the derivation is given.

1. Asafo Sentinel: financial fraud in Ghana

1.1 The market is defined by a regulator that publishes the problem annually

The Bank of Ghana publishes an annual fraud report covering banks, specialised deposit-taking institutions (SDIs) and payment service providers (PSPs). This is an unusually favourable condition for a fraud-prevention vendor: the size, composition and direction of the problem are published by the regulator whose licensees are the buyers.

Reported fraud, all supervised institutions

YEAR	CASES	VALUE AT RISK
2022	15,164	~GH¢82 million
2023	15,865	~GH¢88 million
2024	16,733	~GH¢99 million
2025	**24,778**	**~GH¢101 million**

Source: Bank of Ghana, *Banks, SDIs and PSPs Fraud Report* for each year; 2025 edition published July 2026 (https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/FRAUD-REPORT-2025.pdf).

Case volume rose 63% in 2025 alone. Over the four years shown, cases increased by approximately 63% and value at risk by approximately 23%.

1.2 The growth is concentrated in mobile money, which is Asafo Sentinel’s target

Payment service providers (mobile money), isolated

YEAR	CASES	VALUE AT RISK
2022	12,166	~GH¢26 million
2023	14,655	~GH¢16 million
2024	15,673	~GH¢19 million
2025	**24,124**	**~GH¢37 million**

Source: as above. The Bank of Ghana's 2025 report states a 54% year-on-year rise in PSP fraud cases and a 95% rise in value at risk.

In 2025, PSP cases represented **97% of all reported fraud cases** in the supervised financial sector (24,124 of 24,778 — arithmetic on the published figures). The Bank of Ghana's 2021 report states that all fraud reported by electronic money issuers was mobile-money related.

This concentration matters commercially. It means the fraud problem in Ghana is predominantly a **telephone and mobile-money problem**, which is precisely the interception point Asafo Sentinel occupies.

1.3 The transaction base under threat

INDICATOR	2023	2024	CHANGE
Mobile money transaction volume	6.81 billion	**8.09 billion**	+18.9%
Mobile money transaction value	GH¢1.92 trillion	**GH¢3.01 trillion**	+56.8%
Registered accounts (year end)	66.3m (Jan 2024)	**72.98 million**	—
Active accounts (90-day)	22.79 million	**23.49 million**	+3.0%
Registered agents	—	**882,722**	—
Active agents (30-day)	—	404,370	–33%

Source: Bank of Ghana, *Payment Systems Oversight Annual Report 2024*, Tables 4.2 and A1, published 11 December 2025 (https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Payment-Systems-Annual-Report-2024-1.pdf).

The most recent monthly data available, for June 2026, records **954 million transactions valued at GH¢492.9 billion in a single month**, with registered accounts at 84.6 million and active accounts at 26.4 million (Bank of Ghana, *Summary of Economic and Financial Data*, July 2026, Table 11, https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Summary-of-Economic-and-Financial-Data-July-2026.pdf).

Two source discrepancies are recorded rather than reconciled. Press coverage reported the 2024 value as GH¢3.0192 trillion against the Bank of Ghana report's own GH¢3.0104 trillion; the regulator's figure is used here. Separately, the Bank of Ghana's corporate annual report states active-account growth of 2.4% where its payment systems report computes 3.0% from the same underlying figures.

Why this matters commercially. Fraud value at risk of GH¢101 million sits against a transaction base of GH¢3.01 trillion. The loss rate is therefore very small as a proportion — but the operational, regulatory and reputational cost to an institution is not proportional to the sum lost, and the case count is rising faster than the transaction base. Asafo Sentinel is sold on interception, regulatory reporting and customer protection, not on recovered value alone.

1.4 Insider involvement, which conventional monitoring does not address

The Bank of Ghana reports staff involvement in fraud separately:

YEAR	STAFF-INVOLVED CASES	STAFF DISMISSED
2023	274	not stated
2024	365	155
2025	219	75

Source: Bank of Ghana fraud reports, 2023–2025 editions.

In 2025, banks accounted for 96% of the value at risk from staff cash suppression (approximately GH¢40.7 million) despite representing 22% of such cases.

1.5 The addressable customer set is small, identified and regulated

Asafo Sentinel is sold to institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana. Those institutions are enumerated in public registers, so the addressable market can be counted rather than estimated:

INSTITUTION TYPE	LICENSED, AS AT JULY 2026
Universal banks	23
Payment service providers (Enhanced 51, Medium 5, Standard 2)	58
Dedicated electronic money issuers	5
Payment and financial technology service providers	8
Rural and community banks	147
Savings and loans companies	26
Total licensed institutions	**267**

Telecommunications operators are the other buyer class. Ghana has **three licensed mobile network operators** serving 44.15 million mobile voice subscribers as at June 2026, with MTN holding 72.5%, Telecel 20.7% and AT 6.8% (National Communications Authority subscriber data, June 2026). Mobile money fraud is executed over their networks and SIM-swap fraud is executed on their systems, which makes them both prospective customers and necessary integration partners.

Source: Bank of Ghana registers of regulated institutions, accessed 26 July 2026 (https://www.bog.gov.gh/supervision-regulation/registered-institutions/list-of-licensed-psps/ and related register pages). Licensed PSPs rose from 57 at end-2024 to 71 by July 2026.

Note: the Bank of Ghana's corporate annual report gives 143 rural and community banks where its registers and payment systems report give 147; the same document contains an internal inconsistency between two of its own tables. The register figure is used here and the conflict is disclosed.

The realistic near-term target is far smaller than 267. The institutions with both the fraud exposure and the procurement capacity to buy in the first eighteen months are the universal banks, the dedicated electronic money issuers and the largest payment service providers — on the order of **30 to 40 institutions**, of which the commercially significant initial set is approximately eight. The remaining 200-plus rural banks and smaller providers are a later, lower-price, higher-volume segment and are not relied upon in this plan's revenue projections.

A small buyer set has two consequences that this plan treats as facts rather than obstacles: sales cycles are long and relationship-driven, and each contract is material to revenue. The go-to-market plan is built accordingly.

1.6 External corroboration of the threat environment

- INTERPOL's *Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2025* names Ghana among Africa's principal business email compromise hubs, and reports that cybercrime exceeds 30% of all reported crime in Western and Eastern Africa (https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2025/New-INTERPOL-report-warns-of-sharp-rise-in-cybercrime-in-Africa).
- Ghana's Cyber Security Authority reported losses of GH¢23.3 million to cybercrime in 2024, and more than GH¢19 million in January–September 2025, a 17% increase on the same period of 2024, with 2,008 cases in the first half of 2025 against 1,317 in the first half of 2024.
- LexisNexis Risk Solutions' *True Cost of Fraud Study* for Europe, the Middle East and Africa (2023, fieldwork by Forrester Consulting) finds that every unit of currency lost to fraud costs the affected organisation **3.90 units** once fees, labour, replacement and interest are included (https://risk.lexisnexis.com/global/en/about-us/press-room/press-release/20240417-true-cost-of-fraud-south-africa).

This multiplier is an EMEA-wide figure. LexisNexis does not publish a Ghana-specific multiplier. It is cited here as a regional indicator of the true cost of fraud relative to face value, not as a Ghanaian statistic.

1.7 What is not known, and would require primary research

No public source provides a **Ghana-specific mobile-money fraud rate expressed as a percentage of transactions**, nor a Ghana-specific cost-of-fraud multiplier. Neither GSMA's *State of the Industry Report on Mobile Money*, Smile ID's identity-fraud reports, Sumsub's identity-fraud report nor Kaspersky's financial threat reporting breaks Ghana out individually; regional figures for West Africa are likely dominated by Nigeria and are not presented here as Ghanaian figures.

Obtaining that figure requires direct engagement with the Bank of Ghana, the Cyber Security Authority or a mobile network operator. It is identified in Section 7 as a pilot deliverable rather than assumed.

2. Serene: the mental-health treatment gap in Ghana

2.1 Workforce scarcity is the market

Ghana's specialist mental-health workforce, expressed per 100,000 population:

CADRE	GHANA	AFRICA REGION (MEDIAN)	HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES (MEDIAN)
Psychiatrists	0.2	0.1	7.0
Mental health nurses	4.4	0.6	27.0
Psychologists	0.4	0.2	9.0
Other specialised workers	0.4	0.1	2.7
Total workforce	**5.4**	~1.1 (estimate: sum of cadre medians)	~52.6 (estimate: sum of cadre medians)

Source: World Health Organization, *Mental Health Atlas 2024* (published 2 September 2025), Ghana country profile (https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/mental-health/mental-health-atlas-2024-country-profiles/ghana.pdf) and Table 20 of the global report. Population base 33.8 million (UN World Population Prospects 2023, as used in the Atlas profile).

Ghana is comparatively well provisioned for its region and profoundly under-provisioned against high-income benchmarks: its total mental-health workforce density is approximately **one tenth** of the high-income median.

At 0.2 psychiatrists per 100,000, Ghana has on the order of 68 psychiatrists for 33.8 million people (estimate: 0.2 × 338). Ghana's Mental Health Authority counted 16 psychiatrists on its own payroll at 31 December 2023, against a WHO national figure of 39 in 2020 across all sectors; these figures measure different populations and are not interchangeable.

2.2 The treatment gap, measured rather than repeated

A figure of "98% treatment gap in Ghana" circulates widely in NGO and press material. **Soluteck does not use it, and an investor should not accept it.** Traced to source, it originates in a WHO country summary of October 2007, which derived it by applying the global prevalence rate from the 2004 World Mental Health Survey — a study that did not include Ghana — to Ghana's then population of 21.6 million, and dividing by 2005 treatment counts. The figure was then republished unchanged on a WHO webpage for approximately fifteen years and copied onward through the literature.

The defensible figures are these. Treatment coverage in Ghana, by condition, from WHO's *Special Initiative for Mental Health — Ghana Situational Assessment* (January 2022), using Global Burden of Disease 2019 prevalence and Ghanaian health-management information system treatment data:

CONDITION	ESTIMATED PREVALENCE	TREATMENT COVERAGE	IMPLIED GAP
Major depressive disorder	2.56% (785,510 people)	0.61%	~99.4%
Bipolar disorder	0.51% (157,544 people)	1.68%	~98.3%
Alcohol use disorder	—	2.38%	~97.6%
Epilepsy	0.43% (130,866 people)	14.41%	~85.6%
Schizophrenia	0.20% (59,793 people)	33.21%	~66.8%

Source: https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/mental-health/special-initiative/who-special-initiative-country-report—ghana—2021.pdf. Implied gap is arithmetic on the published coverage figures.

Independent current corroboration comes from a primary field study rather than an extrapolation: Ae-Ngibise et al., *BMC Psychiatry* (2023) screened participants across three Ghanaian districts and found that approximately 98% of those screening positive for depression, psychotic symptoms, epilepsy, suicidal behaviour or alcohol use disorder **were not detected by healthcare workers**, with per-condition non-detection between 94.4% and 99.2% (https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10117267/). This measures non-detection at the point of care, which is a related but distinct measure from national treatment coverage; it is cited here as directional corroboration, not as the same statistic.

Commercial reading. The addressable population is not the whole country. It is the approximately 785,000 Ghanaians estimated to have major depressive disorder, of whom fewer than one in a hundred receives treatment, plus the comparable populations for anxiety and substance-use conditions. Serene does not treat these conditions and does not claim to. It provides low-cost conversational support and structured referral to the small formal system described in Section 2.1 — which is the only realistic role for a product at this price point.

2.3 The affordability gap is the specific opening

Private therapy in Accra is priced at **GH¢320 to GH¢900 per session**, from the published rates of Accra providers including Thrive Care and the Aruka Centre. At the Bank of Ghana's end-2024 reference rate of 14.70 cedis to the dollar, that is approximately US$22 to US$61 for a single session.

Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme extended coverage to four mental-health conditions with effect from 1 November 2024, which is a meaningful policy movement. WHO's *Mental Health Atlas 2024* nonetheless records that patients continue to meet 6% to 20% of costs out of pocket.

This is the gap Serene addresses. A subscription of a few dollars per month is not a substitute for a GH¢500 session with a licensed psychologist, and is not presented as one. It is what stands between that session and nothing at all, for the great majority of the 785,000 people described above who currently receive neither.

2.3 Public funding is minimal and the statutory fund is empty

Mental health represents **0.9% of government health expenditure** in Ghana, against an Africa-region median of 0.6% and a high-income median of 4.3% (WHO *Mental Health Atlas 2024*, Ghana profile).

Earlier WHO instruments record 1.4% (reference year 2011) and 2.97% (Atlas 2020). These figures conflict; the Atlas 2024 figure is used here as the most current, and the historical range is disclosed.

The Mental Health Act, 2012 (Act 846) establishes a Mental Health Fund at sections 80 to 89. The Fund's statutory sources of money are voluntary contributions, parliamentary appropriation, grants and donations; **the Act specifies no levy percentage**, and no levy has been enacted.

The Fund is, in practice, unfunded. The Mental Health Authority's own 2023 Annual Report records the Fund's bank account with a closing balance of **GH¢8,884.58 at 31 December 2023**, against an operational account balance of GH¢3,304,077.23 (https://mha-ghana.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/MHA-ANNUAL-REPORT-2023-Final.pdf, section 3.3). In November 2025, the Board Chair of the Mental Health Society of Ghana stated publicly that the Fund "has remained dormant since its creation" (https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2025/11/15/ghana-mental-health-fund-is-dormant/).

Commercial reading: public provision is not positioned to close this gap in the near term. That is the space a low-cost private service occupies. It is also a caution: this market has limited public money in it, so Serene's revenue must come from individuals and institutions, not from state programmes.

2.4 Demonstrated demand within the formal system

Outpatient attendance at the ten most common diagnoses rose from 73,794 in 2021 to 81,178 in 2023 (estimate: arithmetic sum of the published top-ten table; the Mental Health Authority does not publish an all-diagnosis total). Depression attendances rose from 5,505 to 6,416 and generalised anxiety from 3,530 to 3,751 over the same period.

Source: Mental Health Authority, *Annual Report 2023*, Table 6.1.

These are people who reached a facility. Given a workforce of 5.4 specialists per 100,000, they represent the served minority rather than the extent of need.

2.5 Regulatory position

Act 846 governs mental health care in Ghana and is implemented alongside the Mental Health Regulations, 2019 (L.I. 2385). No amendment to Act 846 was identified in this research. The Act's provisions relevant to Serene concern accreditation for involuntary treatment and patient rights; Serene provides non-clinical conversational support and referral, and does not perform involuntary treatment.

Verification required before launch: Ghana's legal database (ghalii.org) blocked automated access during this research, so the absence of an amendment is established from the Ministry of Health's published text, WHO's 2022 statement that the law had not been revised, and 2024–2025 reporting that discusses implementation rather than amendment. A manual check of the Gazette index is recommended before any categorical statement is made to a regulator or partner.

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3. LaundryHub

Market sizing for LaundryHub is presented in Section 3 of this proposal together with its unit economics, as the two are inseparable for a service-delivery business.

Products, Status and Commercial Model

1. Status at the date of this proposal

All three products are built, tested and deployed. None is a prototype. The capital sought here funds commercial launch, not development.

PRODUCT	BUILT	PROVEN IN PILOT	REVENUE MODEL LIVE
Asafo Sentinel	Complete, including national-system integrations in test mode	Pilot measures detection accuracy on live calls	Contract-based; price discovery is a pilot output
LaundryHub	Customer, driver and partner applications plus admin dashboard	Full order processed end to end, including mobile-money payment	Commission per order; implemented
Serene	Web, admin, user application and therapist application	Full account journey tested to the free-plan limit	Subscription; implemented

2. LaundryHub: market size, built from the census

No authoritative sizing of Ghana's laundry services market exists. No vendor report on this market survived verification. The figure below is therefore constructed from Ghana Statistical Service census data, and every step is shown so that each assumption can be challenged individually.

STEP	FIGURE	BASIS
Greater Accra population	5,455,692	Ghana Statistical Service, 2021 Population and Housing Census, General Report Volume 3
Average household size, Greater Accra	3.2 persons	Same census; smallest of Ghana's 16 regions
Households in Greater Accra	1,702,160	Census-derived; cross-checks to 3.21 persons per household against the published 3.2 average
Households plausibly able to pay (assumption)	**~170,000 (10%)**	**Assumption, not a published figure.** See note below
Average order value	GH¢150	Soluteck's own pricing engine, verified in testing
Orders per active household per month (assumption)	2	**Assumption**
Implied serviceable market value	**~GH¢612 million per year**	170,000 × 2 × GH¢150 × 12
At GH¢12.00 = US$1 (planning rate)	**~US$51 million per year**	Conversion at the planning rate in Section 6

On the 10% assumption. Greater Accra is Ghana's wealthiest region: poverty incidence of 2.5% against a national 23.4%, and mean household welfare of GH¢7,160.63 against a national GH¢4,155.27 (Ghana Statistical Service, GLSS7 Poverty Profile Report, published 2018, most recent data 2016/17). That establishes relative affluence but **does not** establish what share of households would pay for laundry collection. The census carries no income module, and the regional wealth-quintile table that would answer this could not be located. Ten per cent is a deliberately conservative planning figure. It is not presented as a measured statistic, and the pilot's actual conversion data replaces it.

Target capture. The plan targets approximately **1,700 active households by month 18**, which is 1% of the assumed serviceable segment. The market does not need to be large for this business to work; it needs the repeat rate to hold.

2.1 The evidence against LaundryHub, presented rather than omitted

This is the weakest-supported of the three products, and the case against it is specific rather than general.

No Ghanaian laundry marketplace exists. No African laundry equity financing could be sourced from 2023 onward. An absent aggregator is either an unserved opportunity or evidence that the model does not work at Ghanaian price points. Two further findings point toward the second reading.

Glovo invested approximately €3.5 million (US$3.7 million) in Ghana and exited on 10 May 2024, citing a lack of profitability after roughly two years. That was a better-capitalised operator in adjacent on-demand logistics, in this city.

Live Accra pricing shows the structural trap. Bubble Wash publishes GH¢75 for weekend pickup and delivery against GH¢5 per kilogram for premium wash, iron and fold. A ten-kilogram household load is therefore **GH¢50 of service against GH¢75 of logistics**. Logistics cost exceeds service revenue at typical household basket sizes — which is precisely the failure mode that closed comparable businesses internationally.

What this changes in the plan. It does not remove the product; it determines how it is funded:

1. The GH¢150 average order used in these economics is consistent with observed Accra pricing (roughly GH¢75 of processing plus GH¢75 of collection and delivery), so the basket assumption is sound. The margin structure is not generous, and it is dominated by logistics.
2. The determining variable is therefore **batching density** — how many collections a driver completes per route — not customer acquisition. This is why expansion is neighbourhood by neighbourhood and why a neighbourhood is entered only when driver coverage supports it.
3. LaundryHub receives the **smallest capital allocation of the three products**, and it is the product most explicitly conditional on its pilot result. If the repeat rate and route density do not hold, it is held at maintenance cost of approximately US$28 per month rather than funded further.

An investor should treat LaundryHub as the option in this portfolio, not the thesis.

3. Unit economics

3.1 LaundryHub

ITEM	FIGURE
Average order value	GH¢150
Platform commission (planning assumption, 20%)	GH¢30 (~US$2.50)
Platform cost per order, all in	~US$0.23
Contribution per order before acquisition cost	**~US$2.27**

The cost figure is verified from the company's own operating data. The commission rate is a planning assumption to be confirmed in the pilot; drivers and partner laundries are paid from order revenue and are not a call on invested capital.

3.2 Serene

ITEM	FIGURE
Subscription price	US$5 per month
Cost to serve, lower-cost model routing	US$0.33 per subscriber per month
Cost to serve, higher-capability routing	US$1.22 per subscriber per month
Gross margin	**76% to 93%**

Model routing is implemented and controllable, which is why the cost band is this wide and why it is manageable. For context, a single private therapy session in Accra costs GH¢320 to GH¢900.

3.3 Asafo Sentinel

ITEM	FIGURE
Cost per fraud check	Below US$0.01
Cost at pilot volume (10,000 checks per month)	~US$30 per month
Contract value	**Not established — a pilot deliverable**

Cost per check is verified. Contract value is not, and no published benchmark for fraud-prevention vendor contracts in this market survived verification. The pilot's stated objective includes obtaining a price an institution confirms it would pay. **This proposal does not assume a contract value it cannot support**; the revenue scenarios in Section 6 are labelled accordingly.

4. Why the cost structure is the defensible part

Each product's cost to serve is measured, low, and controllable:

- A fraud check costs less than one United States cent, which means Asafo Sentinel is profitable at any price an institution would plausibly pay.
- A Serene subscriber costs between 33 cents and $1.22 per month against a $5 price, and the variable that determines which end of that range applies is a routing decision the company controls.
- A LaundryHub order costs 23 cents to process, most of which is the payment processing fee, against an order value of GH¢150.

The uncertainty in this plan is demand, not cost. That is the correct way round for a business seeking growth capital, and it is why the pilot measures demand before this capital is deployed against it.

Go-to-Market Plan

Three products, three different buyers, three different motions. The plan treats them separately because nothing about acquiring a bank resembles acquiring a household.

1. Asafo Sentinel: institutional sales

Buyer. Head of fraud, chief risk officer or chief operating officer at a bank, payment service provider or mobile network operator. The identified near-term target is 30 to 40 institutions; the initial commercially significant set is approximately eight.

Motion.

STAGE	ACTIVITY	TYPICAL DURATION
1	Demonstration: a simulated fraudulent call in which the caller switches language mid-sentence and the transaction is stopped in under one second	One meeting
2	Technical and security review, including independent penetration test results	4 to 12 weeks
3	Paid pilot on a limited call volume, with detection accuracy and false-positive rate measured against the institution's own fraud data	8 to 12 weeks
4	Contract	4 to 8 weeks

Nine to twelve months from first meeting to contract is the planning assumption. This is why no Asafo Sentinel revenue is assumed before month 12, and why the enterprise account executive is a Phase 2 hire rather than a Phase 3 one: the pipeline must be built long before it converts.

The decisive asset is the demonstration. Ghana's regulator publishes the problem annually, so the buyer does not need to be persuaded that fraud is rising — the Bank of Ghana told them, and told their board. The sales argument is narrower than a market-education argument: it is that this system intercepts language-switching fraud that their existing monitoring does not, in about one second, and that it acts rather than alerts.

Regulatory position: an open question, stated as such. Whether Soluteck itself requires a licence to sell this product is **not settled**, and this proposal does not claim that it is.

The Bank of Ghana operates a **Payment and Financial Technology Service Provider (PFTSP)** licence category whose published list of permissible activities explicitly includes **"fraud management services"**, alongside AML/CFT platforms and KYC authentication, and describes PFTSPs as entities that connect to electronic money issuers, payment service providers and banks. Eight PFTSPs are already licensed. That is a strong indication that the regulator regards fraud-detection-as-a-service supplied into the payments ecosystem as licensable in its own right, rather than as ordinary vendor software.

Separately, Ghana's Cyber Security Authority has required a **Cybersecurity Service Provider licence** for "Managed Cybersecurity Services" — defined to include threat monitoring, detection, prevention and response — since 1 March 2023. Operating without one is an offence under section 49 of Act 1038. No exemption between the two regimes was found.

Consequences taken seriously in this plan:

1. Asafo Sentinel may require a PFTSP licence, a Cybersecurity Service Provider licence, or both. Obtaining a written determination or no-objection from the Bank of Ghana's FinTech and Innovation Office is a **month-one action**, not a later formality, and is budgeted in Section 6.
2. Secondary sources describe the PFTSP category as restricted to Ghanaian-owned entities. This was **not verified against the primary notice**, but if correct it couples the licensing path to the company's ownership structure, and therefore to the terms of this investment. It must be modelled with counsel **before a round closes, not after**.
3. Sales to institutions can proceed on the pilot and demonstration path while the determination is sought; large-scale production deployment should not.

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2. LaundryHub: neighbourhood by neighbourhood

Buyer. Households in specific Accra neighbourhoods, reached where they live rather than through national advertising.

Method. The unit of expansion is a neighbourhood, not the city. A neighbourhood is entered only when three conditions hold: sufficient driver coverage, at least two partner laundries with capacity, and a proven repeat rate in the neighbourhoods already running. This is deliberately slower than a city-wide launch and is the principal defence against the failure mode that has characterised on-demand laundry internationally — buying growth faster than the unit economics can support it.

Channels, in order of expected efficiency:

1. **Branded laundry bags.** A bag carrying the company name, carried through a neighbourhood twice weekly, is advertising bought once and delivered repeatedly. It is the highest-leverage item in the budget.
2. **Estate and salon partnerships.** Concentrated households, one negotiation.
3. **Targeted social advertising** within a defined radius.
4. **Local content creators** demonstrating collection and delivery.
5. **Referral credit**, capped monthly and discontinued within a week if it does not pay for itself.

Target: approximately 1,700 active households by month 18, across six to eight neighbourhoods.

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3. Serene: discoverability and institutional partnership

Buyer. Individuals seeking affordable support, and the institutions that serve concentrated populations of them.

Constraint that shapes everything. Advertising for mental-health services is restricted on both Facebook and Google, and claims of clinical outcome are prohibited by those platforms and improper in any case. Paid acquisition is therefore a minor channel by necessity, not by preference.

Channels:

1. **Search discoverability.** Written guides on stress, sleep and examination anxiety, matched to what people actually search for. The founder writes the content; the budget covers design and production.
2. **University partnerships.** Ghanaian universities concentrate the target population and already operate counselling offices that are over-subscribed — the referral relationship is mutually useful rather than purely commercial.
3. **Employer and insurer channels**, explored in the second half of the period.
4. **A limited, carefully worded advertising test.**

Positioning discipline. Serene is marketed as non-clinical conversational support with structured referral. It does not diagnose, does not treat, and is not described as therapy. This is a compliance boundary (Section 7), not a stylistic choice, and it constrains the acquisition rate — which is reflected in the conservative subscriber targets in Section 6.

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4. What the three share

One engineering team, one infrastructure platform, one payment integration, one authentication system, and one founder's time. The marginal cost of operating a third product is materially lower than the cost of the first, which is the economic argument for the portfolio and the reason a US$500,000 raise can launch three products rather than one.

The commercial motions do not share resources. That is why only one commercial hire is required: Asafo Sentinel needs a salesperson, LaundryHub needs a field operator, and Serene needs content and partnerships rather than a sales team.

Organisation and Operating Plan

1. Position today

Soluteck has one person: the founder, who has written all three products. This is the company's principal operational risk (Section 7) and the largest single call on the capital sought.

2. Hiring plan

The team is built in three phases over eighteen months, reaching thirteen people including the founder. Hiring is deliberately back-loaded: the first phase removes the single-point-of-failure risk and supports the products already in market; the commercial hires follow once the pilot has established which products justify them.

Phase 1 — months 1 to 3 (6 people)

ROLE	COUNT	PURPOSE
Founder / Chief Executive	1	Product, architecture, institutional relationships
Backend engineer (mid-level)	2	Remove key-person dependency; own two products each
Mobile engineer	1	Five shipped applications across two products
Operations manager	1	LaundryHub driver and partner-laundry operations
Customer support agent	1	All three products

Phase 2 — months 4 to 9 (10 people)

ROLE ADDED	COUNT	PURPOSE
DevOps / cloud engineer	1	Production posture: multi-availability-zone, backups, monitoring, the security controls institutional customers require
Enterprise account executive	1	Asafo Sentinel sales into banks, telcos and payment providers
Field / sales lead	1	LaundryHub neighbourhood expansion and partner acquisition
Product designer	1	Conversion and retention work across all three products

Phase 3 — months 10 to 18 (13 people)

ROLE ADDED	COUNT	PURPOSE
Backend engineer	1	Capacity for whichever product is scaling
Customer support agent	1	Volume growth
QA engineer	1	Release quality across five applications and three web products
Finance and administration officer	1	Statutory compliance, payroll, reporting to investors

3. Compensation basis

Salaries are set from published Ghanaian market data. The figures below are the planning mid-points used in Section 6, expressed as monthly gross.

ROLE	PLANNING FIGURE (GH¢/MONTH)	MARKET RANGE FOUND	CONFIDENCE IN THE RANGE
Backend engineer (mid-level)	12,000	8,000 – 15,000	**High** — three independent sources converge
Mobile engineer	12,000	wide; proxy titles only	Low
DevOps / cloud engineer	14,000	very wide	Low to medium
Product designer	8,000	1,681 – 10,165	Low
QA engineer	7,000	single source	**Very low**
Enterprise account executive	20,000	no role-specific Ghanaian data found	**Very low — see note**
Field / sales lead	10,000	1,500 – 17,800	Low to medium
Operations manager	12,000	1,500 – 27,000	Low to medium
Customer support agent	3,500	500 – 5,555	Medium
Finance and administration officer	6,000	1,400 – 7,350	Medium
Founder / Chief Executive	15,000	set below market by choice	—

Disclosure on salary data quality. Only the mid-level backend engineer figure rests on multiple converging sources. Several widely used salary sites were inaccessible or returned implausible outliers and were excluded rather than used. No Ghana-specific benchmark for an enterprise account executive selling into banks was found anywhere; that figure is a proxy and should be validated by direct benchmarking before the role is offered. Salary variance is the largest single source of error in the budget, and the contingency in Section 6 is sized with that in mind.

4. Employer statutory costs

ITEM	RATE	APPLIES TO
SSNIT employer contribution	**13%** of salary	Employer, additional to gross
SSNIT employee contribution	5.5% of salary	Deducted from the employee
Maximum insurable earnings ceiling	GH¢61,000 per month (from January 2025)	Above the salaries planned here

Source: PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries — Ghana, reviewed 11 March 2026; SSNIT ceiling from the January 2025 public notice as reported by five independent secondary sources. SSNIT's own website could not be opened during this research and the ceiling therefore rests on secondary confirmation. Whether the ceiling applies to the privately managed Tier 2 portion as well as the Tier 1 portion was not confirmed; it does not affect this budget, because no planned salary approaches GH¢61,000.

The budget in Section 6 applies the 13% employer contribution to all salaries. PAYE income tax is deducted from employee gross pay and is not an additional employer cost.

5. Where the team sits

Accra. The plan budgets co-working space rather than a leased office for the funding period; a lease is not a good use of investor capital at this headcount, and the operations and field roles are substantially out of the office in any case.

SECTION 6 OF 8

Financial Plan and Use of Funds

1. The request

Soluteck seeks US$500,000 for an eighteen-month commercial launch of Asafo Sentinel, LaundryHub and Serene in Ghana.

The figure is built from the bottom up in the use-of-funds breakdown below. It is not derived from a target valuation or from comparable round sizes; those are used later in this section only to check that the request is reasonable, after it was calculated.

2. Planning assumptions stated before the numbers

ASSUMPTION	VALUE	BASIS AND RISK
Planning exchange rate	**GH¢12.00 = US$1**	Deliberately conservative. The cedi traded at 11.681 in September 2025 but has **weakened 11.26% over the twelve months to 24 July 2026**, including 3.77% in the most recent month. Because salaries are paid in cedis, a *stronger* cedi raises the dollar cost of this plan — so the planning rate is set near the strong end of recent experience rather than the weak end. Sensitivity is shown below.
Inflation	**5.3% (June 2026, latest print)**	Down sharply from 23.8% at end-2024, but **reaccelerating**: 3.8% in January 2026, 3.7% in May, 5.3% in June. Salary figures assume disinflation broadly holds; a return to double digits would require mid-period salary revision.
Funding period	18 months	Standard for this stage and sufficient to reach the milestones set out below.
Revenue treatment	Excluded from the funding requirement	Revenue earned during the period extends runway rather than reducing the request.

Currency and inflation figures are drawn from secondary aggregators rather than Bank of Ghana primary releases, and are labelled accordingly.

One further signal is disclosed because it cuts against the optimistic reading. Ghana's foreign exchange reserves fell from a record US$14.5 billion in May 2026 to **US$12.94 billion by 22 July 2026** — a decline of roughly 9% in one quarter, with import cover slipping to about five months. Together with the currency and inflation prints above, this indicates that the 2025 "best performing currency" narrative is stale. This plan does not rely on it.

3. Use of funds

3.1 Personnel — US$210,000 (42%)

Built from the phased hiring plan in Section 5, at the salary mid-points stated there, with the 13% SSNIT employer contribution applied to all salaries.

PHASE	MONTHS	PEOPLE	GROSS PAYROLL (GH¢/MONTH)	WITH 13% EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION	PERIOD TOTAL (GH¢)
1	1–3	6	66,500	75,145	225,435
2	4–9	10	118,500	133,905	803,430
3	10–18	13	147,000	166,110	1,494,990
Total	**18**				**2,523,855**

At GH¢12.00 = US$1: **US$210,321**.

3.2 Customer acquisition — US$123,000 (25%)

PRODUCT	RATE	PERIOD TOTAL
LaundryHub	US$2,000/month for months 1–6, US$4,000/month thereafter	US$60,000
Serene	US$2,000/month	US$36,000
Asafo Sentinel	US$1,500/month	US$27,000
Total		**US$123,000**

The allocation follows the buyer, on the same principle set out in the pilot package: institutions are reached through demonstration and meetings, households through neighbourhood presence, and individuals through search discoverability and partnerships. **No Ghana-specific paid-media benchmark was found in research**; Nigerian and Kenyan cost-per-click data are the nearest comparables and are treated as assumptions. The pilot produces Ghana-specific figures as a by-product of its own smaller acquisition spending, and those replace these assumptions before the larger budget is committed.

3.3 Infrastructure and model inference — US$43,000 (9%)

ITEM	BASIS	PERIOD TOTAL
Production infrastructure	Multi-availability-zone, automated backups, monitoring, audit logging — the posture institutional customers require, materially above the pilot's shared configuration	US$21,600
AI model inference and language processing	Serene conversations and Asafo Sentinel fraud checks at growing volume	US$21,600
Total		**US$43,200**

3.4 Legal, regulatory, licensing and security — US$30,000 (6%)

ITEM	AMOUNT
Independent security audit and penetration test	US$12,000
Ghana-qualified counsel: **licensing determination (BoG PFTSP / CSA)**, call-recording consent opinion, institutional contracts, data processing agreements	US$12,000
Insurance	US$3,000
Company, Data Protection Commission and licence application fees	US$3,000

The counsel line is larger than a company at this stage would normally carry, for the reason set out in Section 7: whether Asafo Sentinel requires its own Bank of Ghana or Cyber Security Authority licence is unresolved, and it interacts with the ownership structure of this investment. Resolving it is a month-one action.

The security audit is not optional. Banks and telecommunications operators require independent security assessment before permitting a vendor near customer data or payment systems. Budgeting for it is a precondition of Asafo Sentinel's sales process, not an overhead.

3.5 Equipment and workspace — US$25,000 (5%)

Thirteen laptops at approximately US$1,150 each (US$14,950) and co-working desks scaling with headcount, averaging US$560 per month (US$10,080). No office lease is proposed at this headcount.

3.6 Summary and contingency

CATEGORY	AMOUNT	SHARE
Personnel	US$210,000	42%
Customer acquisition	US$123,000	25%
Infrastructure and inference	US$43,000	9%
Legal, regulatory, licensing and security	US$30,000	6%
Equipment and workspace	US$25,000	5%
Application store fees and sundries	US$1,000	—
Subtotal	**US$432,000**	
Contingency at 15%	US$65,000	13%
Total requested	**US$500,000**	**100%**

The contingency is set at 15% rather than a token 10% for a stated reason: the salary data underpinning 42% of this budget is of mixed quality (Section 5), and the exchange rate is the single largest external variable.

4. Revenue scenarios

These are scenarios, not forecasts. Each rests on assumptions the pilot is designed to test, and each assumption is labelled. **No revenue is assumed in the funding requirement.**

Position at month 18:

PRODUCT	LOW	BASE	HIGH	PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTION
Asafo Sentinel	US$2,000/mo	US$6,000/mo	US$10,000/mo	Contract value of US$2,000 per institution per month. **Not established** — the pilot's price-discovery objective sets this. 1, 3 or 5 institutions signed.
LaundryHub	US$4,000/mo	US$8,500/mo	US$15,000/mo	800 / 1,700 / 3,000 active households at 2 orders per month and a GH¢30 commission
Serene	US$4,000/mo	US$10,000/mo	US$20,000/mo	800 / 2,000 / 4,000 paying subscribers at US$5 per month
Total monthly	**US$10,000**	**US$24,500**	**US$45,000**	
Annualised run rate	US$120,000	**US$294,000**	US$540,000	

The base case reaches approximate operating breakeven

Monthly operating cost at month 18, at full headcount:

ITEM	US$/MONTH
Payroll including employer contribution	13,843
Customer acquisition	7,500
Infrastructure and inference	2,400
Workspace and sundries	1,000
Total	**24,743**

Against base-case revenue of US$24,500 per month, the company approaches **operating breakeven at the end of the funding period.** That is the objective of this raise: not to reach a valuation event, but to reach the point where the business sustains itself, with the option to raise growth capital from a position of evidence rather than need.

5. Milestones

BY MONTH	MILESTONE
3	Two engineers productive; no production system dependent on one person. Phase 1 team in place.
6	Asafo Sentinel: first institutional trial agreement executed, and national-system integrations moved from test to production under signed agreements. LaundryHub operating in three Accra neighbourhoods.
9	Independent security audit completed and remediated. Serene retention measured over a full quarter with the model-routing threshold established.
12	First Asafo Sentinel revenue contract. LaundryHub repeat-order rate confirmed at or above the pilot's threshold, or the product held at maintenance cost.
18	Base-case run rate of approximately US$294,000, approaching operating breakeven; evidence sufficient to raise growth capital or to continue without it.

6. Positioning against comparable financings

The request was calculated bottom-up. This section checks it for reasonableness against publicly reported African rounds in the same three categories.

CATEGORY	COMPARABLE ROUNDS	MEDIAN
Fintech fraud, identity and compliance	Cleva US$1.5m pre-seed (2024); Regfyl US$1.1m pre-seed (2024); Youverify US$2.5m pre-Series A (2024)	~US$1.3m
Consumer logistics and on-demand services	Fez Delivery US$1.0m (2023); Renda US$1.9m (2024); Chowdeck US$2.5m seed (2024)	~US$2.2m
Digital and mental health	Kena Health US$2.0m (2023); Waspito US$2.5m (2023); Ilara Health US$4.2m (2024)	~US$3.35m

Sources are named financings reported by TechCrunch, TechCabal and equivalent outlets; medians are arithmetic on small samples and are indicative only.

US$500,000 is below the median seed round for any one of the three categories this company operates in. The request funds three launched products for eighteen months for less than a single-product company in any of these markets typically raises. That is a function of a low cost base in Accra, shared infrastructure, and products that are already built.

7. Sensitivity

VARIABLE	CHANGE	EFFECT ON THE 18-MONTH REQUIREMENT
Exchange rate	GH¢12.00 → GH¢14.70 (January 2025 level)	Payroll falls to ~US$172,000; requirement falls by ~US$44,000
Exchange rate	GH¢12.00 → GH¢10.00 (cedi strengthens further)	Payroll rises to ~US$252,000; requirement rises by ~US$48,000
Salaries	+25% against planning mid-points	Requirement rises by ~US$60,000, within the contingency
Hiring	Phase 3 deferred by three months	Requirement falls by ~US$42,000

Because salaries are paid in cedis and the requirement is stated in dollars, a weakening cedi reduces the dollar cost of the team while raising the cost of infrastructure and model inference, which are dollar-denominated. The two move in opposite directions, and personnel is the larger exposure.

8. A larger deployment, if preferred

Should an investor wish to deploy more capital, **US$1.2 million over 24 months** funds the plan above plus entry into Nigeria for Asafo Sentinel — the largest mobile-money fraud market in West Africa — with a dedicated commercial hire, local regulatory and legal work, and a longer runway to a Series A.

This option is presented because it was asked for, not because it is recommended ahead of the base plan. **The base plan should be funded first.** Nigeria entry before Ghanaian institutional contracts are signed would spend capital on a second unproven market while the first remains unproven, which is the error this plan is constructed to avoid.

SECTION 7 OF 8

Risks, Mitigations and Governance

This section states the material risks to the plan, including those an investor would raise unprompted. Each is followed by the mitigation actually built into the plan, or by an acknowledgement that no adequate mitigation exists.

1. Unresolved legal questions, stated first because they rank first

Two questions about Asafo Sentinel could not be resolved from public sources. They are placed ahead of every commercial risk in this document because they bear on whether the flagship product can be sold, and in one case on whether it can lawfully operate at scale.

1.1 Does Soluteck require its own licence?

The Bank of Ghana's **PFTSP** licence category lists **"fraud management services"** among its permissible activities and describes such providers as connecting to banks, electronic money issuers and payment service providers. Eight are licensed. Separately, the Cyber Security Authority has required a **Cybersecurity Service Provider licence** for "Managed Cybersecurity Services" — threat monitoring, detection, prevention and response — since 1 March 2023, and unlicensed operation is an offence under section 49 of Act 1038. No exemption between the two regimes was found.

Asafo Sentinel plausibly falls within both definitions.

ACTION	TIMING
Written determination or no-objection from the Bank of Ghana's FinTech and Innovation Office	Month 1
Ghana-qualified counsel opinion covering both the BoG and CSA regimes	Month 1
CSA licence application if required	On determination

Interaction with this investment. Secondary sources describe the PFTSP category as restricted to Ghanaian-owned entities. That was not verified against the primary notice. If it is correct, the licensing path and the company's ownership structure constrain one another, and the point must be settled with counsel **before a round closes**. An investor should not discover this after subscribing.

1.2 Is one-party or all-party consent required to record a call?

Asafo Sentinel analyses live calls. Whether Ghanaian law — the Electronic Communications Act (Act 775) read with the Data Protection Act (Act 843) — permits this on the authorisation of the operator alone, or requires the consent of every party to the call including the customer, **could not be resolved**. Ghana's legal database blocked automated access, and no standalone Ghanaian call-recording statute distinct from those two instruments was found.

This is the higher-consequence of the two questions, because an all-party standard would require the product's consent flow to be redesigned around customer notification rather than institutional authorisation.

Neither question is presented here as solved. Both are funded and scheduled in month one, and an investor is entitled to make completion of the counsel opinion a condition of drawdown.

2. Portfolio risk: three products, one company

The objection. An early-stage company pursuing three unrelated products in three unrelated markets typically dilutes its effort and succeeds at none. This is the single most reasonable objection to this proposal.

The response. It is a real risk and it is accepted deliberately, on three conditions written into this plan:

1. **The pilot decides allocation, not the plan.** Capital is not divided evenly. The three-month pilot preceding this raise produces a measured result for each product — repeat-order rate, weekly return rate, and signed institutional trial respectively. Products that meet their threshold receive the growth capital; products that do not are held at maintenance cost, which is approximately $28 per month each, or discontinued.
2. **The products share one technical foundation.** They share infrastructure, deployment tooling, authentication, payment integration and the engineering team. The marginal cost of operating a third product is materially lower than the cost of the first.
3. **Only one product requires an enterprise sales motion.** Asafo Sentinel is sold to institutions; LaundryHub and Serene are self-serve consumer products. The organisation plan therefore requires one commercial hire, not three distinct sales organisations.

Residual risk after mitigation: high. An investor who is unwilling to fund a portfolio at this stage should fund Asafo Sentinel alone, which has the clearest buyer, the highest contract value and the strongest published evidence of market need. This proposal is structured so that option remains available.

3. Key-person risk

The risk. Soluteck has one founder, who has written the entire codebase of all three products. Departure, illness or incapacity would halt the company.

Mitigation. The first engineering hires in the organisation plan exist substantially to remove this dependency: documented handover of each product, paired ownership of every production system, and no system with a single human point of failure by the end of month six. Deployment is already automated and documented rather than resident in the founder's memory.

Residual risk: high until the first two engineers are productive, which the plan places at month three to four.

4. Currency mismatch

The risk. Revenue from LaundryHub and Serene is earned in Ghana cedis. Infrastructure, AI model inference and store fees are paid in United States dollars. Cedi depreciation compresses margin without any operational failure.

Mitigation. Consumer pricing is reviewed quarterly against the exchange rate; Asafo Sentinel contracts with institutions are denominated in dollars where the counterparty accepts it; the largest variable dollar cost, AI inference, is directly controllable through model routing, which is already implemented.

Residual risk: moderate and outside the company's control.

5. Product-specific risks

5.1 Asafo Sentinel

RISK	ASSESSMENT
National-system integrations operate in test mode. Production use of the identity register, handset blacklist and interbank payment infrastructure requires executed agreements with those institutions.	This is the principal risk to the product. It is a commercial negotiation, not outstanding development. It cannot be resolved with capital alone and its timing is not fully within the company's control.
Long procurement cycles at banks and telcos, including security review and penetration testing.	Budgeted for in the plan as time, not treated as an exception. Revenue from this product is not assumed in the first two quarters.
Buyer concentration: a small number of institutions.	Each contract is material, which cuts both ways. Loss of one prospective customer materially changes the revenue path.
False positives freezing legitimate customer accounts.	The product acts automatically on funds and handsets. An incorrect interception has direct customer harm and reputational consequences for the institution. Threshold tuning and a human-review path are required contractual features, not optional settings.

5.2 LaundryHub

RISK	ASSESSMENT
Repeat-order rate is unproven.	This determines whether the business exists. It is the pilot's primary measurement, and this proposal's LaundryHub allocation is explicitly conditional on it.
On-demand laundry has a poor record internationally: thin margins, high acquisition cost, and operational dependence on third-party labour.	Acknowledged without qualification. The mitigation is a low fixed cost base and neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood expansion rather than city-wide launch, so that unit economics are proven at small scale before capital is committed to growth.
Driver supply and reliability.	Directly measured during the pilot. Insufficient driver coverage in a target neighbourhood defers expansion into it rather than degrading service in it.
Partner laundry quality and capacity.	Customer-visible failures are attributed to LaundryHub regardless of which partner caused them. Partner performance is measured per order from launch.

5.3 Serene

RISK	ASSESSMENT
Clinical safety. Users in crisis may use the product.	A crisis-detection defect that computed appropriate emergency resources and then failed to display them was identified and corrected before launch. Crisis handling is treated as a safety-critical path subject to explicit testing, not an ordinary product feature.
Advertising for mental-health services is restricted on major platforms, and clinical-outcome claims are prohibited and improper.	The acquisition plan is weighted to search discoverability and institutional partnership rather than paid advertising. This constrains growth rate and is reflected in the projections.
Retention. Conversational products of this type commonly show high early churn.	Weekly return rate is the pilot's primary measurement for this product.
Model cost per conversation varies by a factor of approximately seventeen depending on routing.	Routing is implemented and controllable. Establishing the correct threshold is a pilot objective.
Therapist supply and cost if live therapy is offered.	Human therapy at $12 to $25 per hour is a different business with different economics. It is excluded from this plan's projections.
Ghana's public mental-health funding is minimal and the statutory Mental Health Fund is dormant.	Revenue must come from individuals and institutions. No public-sector revenue is assumed.
Regulation of AI mental-health products is tightening internationally.	Material and addressed below.

Regulatory precedent for AI mental-health products. During 2025, three United States jurisdictions enacted statutes restricting AI systems that provide therapy or psychotherapeutic services: Illinois (Wellness and Oversight for Psychological Resources Act), Nevada (AB 406) and Utah (HB 452). The Federal Trade Commission opened an inquiry into AI companion products in September 2025, and wrongful-death litigation against Character.AI is proceeding.

Separately, Woebot — the most established clinically-oriented conversational mental-health product — **withdrew its consumer application on 30 June 2025**.

Neither the statutes nor the litigation binds a Ghanaian company operating in Ghana. They matter to this plan for three reasons, and are treated as governing constraints rather than distant news:

1. They establish the direction of regulatory travel. Ghana's regulators are not obliged to follow, but international precedent informs how a Ghanaian regulator, insurer or university partner will assess the product.

2. They define the boundary Serene must not cross in its marketing. Serene is positioned as **non-clinical conversational support with structured referral**. It does not diagnose, does not treat, does not claim therapeutic outcome, and does not describe itself as therapy. This is a product and compliance constraint, not a copywriting preference.
3. Woebot's withdrawal is evidence that a consumer subscription business in this category is difficult even with clinical credibility and United States funding. Serene's economics do not depend on replicating that model at that cost base; its cost to serve is between $0.33 and $1.22 per subscriber per month. That is the reason to believe it can work where a better-funded predecessor did not, and it is a claim the pilot must substantiate before this capital is deployed against it.

6. Regulatory and data protection

All three products process personal data of Ghanaian residents and are subject to the Data Protection Act, 2012 (Act 843) and registration with the Data Protection Commission. Asafo Sentinel additionally processes financial and call data on behalf of regulated institutions, and its contracts will require the security and audit provisions those institutions impose on vendors.

Serene operates within the Mental Health Act, 2012 (Act 846) environment as a non-clinical support and referral service. It does not perform involuntary treatment and does not hold accreditation for it.

Verification outstanding: Ghana's legal information database blocked automated access during preparation of this proposal. The absence of amendments to Act 846 is established from the Ministry of Health's published text and subsequent WHO and press reporting. A manual Gazette check is recommended before any categorical representation is made to a regulator or institutional partner.

7. Governance and reporting

ITEM	COMMITMENT
Financial reporting	Monthly management accounts: expenditure by category and product, cash position, and months of runway remaining.
Operating reporting	Monthly, per product: the product's primary metric (repeat-order rate, weekly return rate, institutional pipeline stage), customers acquired, and cost per acquired customer.
Capital allocation	Reported against the allocation table in Section 6. Any reallocation between products exceeding 15% of a product's budget is reported in the month it occurs, with the reasoning.
Discontinuation	If a product fails its stated threshold, the fact is reported in that month together with the recommended action. Products are not sustained on optimism.
Board or investor observer	Soluteck will accommodate an investor-appointed observer or director as agreed at the time of investment.

8. What would cause this plan to fail

Stated plainly, so that it can be monitored rather than discovered:

1. Asafo Sentinel’s national-system agreements are not executed within the first two quarters, removing the product’s principal differentiator from the sales argument.
2. LaundryHub’s repeat-order rate proves too low to support acquisition cost, and the capital allocated to it is spent before that is recognised.
3. The first engineering hires are not productive quickly enough, and the founder remains the constraint on all three products simultaneously.
4. Cedi depreciation outpaces the ability to reprice consumer products.

The reporting commitments in Section 7 above are designed so that each of these becomes visible within one month of occurring rather than at the end of the funding period.

Sources and Method

1. Evidentiary standard applied to this proposal

Every quantitative claim in this document falls into one of three categories, and is labelled as such wherever it appears:

CATEGORY	TREATMENT
Published figure	Attributed to a named organisation, with the document title, URL and the period the data covers.
Estimate	Derived by arithmetic from published figures. The derivation is shown. Never presented as a published statistic.
Not established	Stated as unknown. Not filled with a plausible number.

Where two credible sources conflict, both are shown and the conflict is disclosed. No conflict in this document has been resolved by selecting the more favourable figure.

2. Claims this document deliberately does not make

An investor reviewing proposals from this market will encounter certain figures repeatedly. Soluteck has examined the most common ones and declines to use them:

“98% of Ghanaians with mental illness receive no treatment.” Traced to a WHO country summary of October 2007, which applied the global prevalence rate from the 2004 World Mental Health Survey — a study that did not survey Ghana — to Ghana’s then population of 21.6 million, and divided by 2005 treatment counts. The document contains an internal inconsistency in the treatment count it uses, and records an alternative internal estimate implying a materially different gap. WHO then republished the figure unchanged on a static webpage for approximately fifteen years, from which it entered the academic and NGO literature. One widely cited paper carrying the figure has an unresolvable citation for it.

This proposal instead uses per-condition treatment coverage from WHO’s *Special Initiative for Mental Health — Ghana Situational Assessment* (January 2022), based on Global Burden of Disease 2019 prevalence and Ghanaian health-management information system data, corroborated by a 2023 primary field study.

A Ghana-specific mobile-money fraud rate. No such figure is published. GSMA, Smile ID, Sumsub, LexisNexis and Kaspersky each either omit Ghana or report it only inside a West Africa aggregate likely dominated by Nigeria. Regional figures are not presented in this document as Ghanaian figures.

A Ghana-specific cost-of-fraud multiplier. LexisNexis publishes country breakouts for South Africa and several other markets, but not Ghana. Its EMEA-wide multiplier of 3.90 is cited only as a regional indicator and is labelled as such.

Ghana-specific paid-advertising benchmarks. No Meta, Google or TikTok cost-per-click or cost-per-thousand-impression benchmark specific to Ghana was located. Nigerian and Kenyan figures are the nearest comparables and are treated as assumptions requiring validation, not as Ghanaian data.

3. Principal primary sources

Financial sector and payments

- Bank of Ghana, *Banks, SDIs and PSPs Fraud Report*, editions 2021 through 2025. The 2025 edition was published in July 2026: https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/FRAUD-REPORT-2025.pdf
- Bank of Ghana, *Payment Systems Oversight Annual Report 2024*, published 11 December 2025: https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Payment-Systems-Annual-Report-2024-1.pdf
- Bank of Ghana, *Summary of Economic and Financial Data*, July 2026 edition (monthly payment systems table): https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Summary-of-Economic-and-Financial-Data-July-2026.pdf
- Bank of Ghana, registers of regulated institutions (banks, licensed payment service providers, rural and community banks, savings and loans companies), accessed 26 July 2026.

Mental health

- World Health Organization, *Mental Health Atlas 2024*, Ghana country profile, published 2 September 2025: https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/mental-health/mental-health-atlas-2024-country-profiles/ghana.pdf
- World Health Organization, *Special Initiative for Mental Health — Ghana Situational Assessment*, January 2022: https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/mental-health/special-initiative/who-special-initiative-country-report—ghana—2021.pdf
- Mental Health Authority of Ghana, *Annual Report 2023*: https://mha-ghana.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/MHA-ANNUAL-REPORT-2023-Final.pdf
- Ministry of Health, Ghana, *Mental Health Act, 2012 (Act 846)*, full text: https://www.moh.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Mental-Health-Act-846-2012.pdf
- Ae-Ngibise et al., *BMC Psychiatry* 23:280 (2023), primary field study of detection rates across three Ghanaian districts: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10117267/

Threat environment

- INTERPOL, *Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2025*.
- Ghana Cyber Security Authority loss figures, as reported by Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, 2025.
- LexisNexis Risk Solutions, *True Cost of Fraud Study, EMEA*, 2023, fieldwork by Forrester Consulting.

Digital population

- DataReportal, *Digital 2026: Ghana*, published 8 November 2025: https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2026-ghana

4. Verification outstanding before external circulation

These items could not be completed from public sources and are recorded as open:

1. **Ghana's legal information database (ghalii.org) blocked automated access.** The absence of amendments to the Mental Health Act, 2012 is established from the Ministry of Health's published text, WHO's January 2022 statement that the law had not been revised, and 2024–2025 reporting discussing implementation rather than amendment. A manual Gazette check is recommended before any categorical representation is made to a regulator or partner.
2. **Ghana-specific fraud loss rate as a percentage of mobile money transactions.** Requires direct engagement with the Bank of Ghana, the Cyber Security Authority or a mobile network operator. Identified as a pilot deliverable.
3. **Ghana-specific paid-media benchmarks.** Require a live geo-targeted campaign or a quotation from a Ghanaian media-buying agency. The pilot produces these as a by-product of its acquisition spending.
4. **The two legal questions in Section 7**: whether Asafo Sentinel requires a Bank of Ghana PFTSP licence and/or a Cyber Security Authority licence, and whether Ghanaian law requires one-party or all-party consent to record a call. Ghana's legal database blocked automated access throughout this research, and the PFTSP ownership restriction rests on secondary sources that were not verified against the primary notice. Both require Ghana-qualified counsel.
5. **Reconciliation of conflicting figures disclosed in this document**, including the Bank of Ghana's rural and community bank count (143 against 147, with an internal inconsistency in the regulator's own annual report) and Ghana's psychiatric hospital bed capacity (1,171 against 700 across two WHO instruments covering the same period).

5. Why this section exists

Diligence on this proposal will test its numbers. Presenting figures that do not survive that test would cost more than the figures are worth. The material weakness in the widely circulated statistics for these markets is that they are old extrapolations repeated as current measurements; the material strength of the Ghanaian financial sector data is that the regulator publishes it annually and the buyers are named in public registers.

This document is built on the second category and explicitly refuses the first.